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We assess the extent to which a country’s external capital structure can aid in mitigating the macroeconomic
impact of oil price shocks. We study two Caribbean economies highly vulnerable to oil price shocks,
an oil-importer (Jamaica) and an oil-exporter (Trinidad and Tobago). From a risk-sharing perspective,
a desirable external capital structure is one that, through international capital gains and losses, helps
offset responses of the current account balance to external shocks. We find that both countries could
alter their international portfolio to provide a more effective buffer against such shocks.
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Oil-dependent economies, whether importers or exporters, are particularly exposed to large 
and volatile shocks associated with oil price fluctuations. The macroeconomic impact of these 
shocks is pervasive, encompassing the government’s budget process and balance sheet, as well as 
private-sector production and consumption decisions. Insuring against the impact of energy price 
shocks directly through futures or over-the-counter derivative contracts is difficult, as the typical 
maturity of available instruments is either too short or the insurance is too costly for small, below-
investment-grade economies. It is therefore useful to think about additional insurance and risk-
sharing mechanisms that can enhance the set of available (and tradable) financial instruments.  
A country’s external capital structure (the composition of foreign assets and liabilities by 
instrument, currency, and maturity) can mitigate or exacerbate the impact of external shocks. For 
instance, foreign currency exposure may turn an otherwise benign real exchange response to an oil 
price shock into a negative financial shock with undesirable contractionary effects. Similarly, the 
maturity structure and instrument composition of foreign assets and liabilities (i.e., debt versus 
equity or particular sectors of world equity markets as opposed to others) may significantly affect 
the response to energy price and other external shocks.  
In this paper we examine how, in two countries that are strongly impacted by oil price 
fluctuations (Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago), the external capital structure did in the past—and 
can in the future—mitigate the repercussions of oil shocks. We explore questions related to three 
aspects of the external capital structure: its characteristics, its role in adjustment to oil price shocks, 
and possible future modifications. What are the characteristics of the existing external capital 
structure? Is there a substantial currency mismatch? What is the role of the external capital structure 
in the adjustment to oil shocks? Does it aid in the international sharing of the risk oil shocks pose, 2 
 
or does it hinder risk sharing? How can the existing capital structure be modified to ameliorate the 
transmission of oil shocks? The main findings are as follows.  
  Characteristics of External Capital Structures. Trinidad and Tobago does not have a 
currency mismatch, as its foreign currency assets exceed its foreign currency liabilities. 
In contrast, Jamaica has a substantial currency mismatch, with large dollar liabilities 
unmatched by dollar assets or export revenues. This basic fact about Jamaica’s external 
capital structure is important to keep in mind.  
  Role of the External Capital Structure in Response to Oil Price Shocks. In both countries 
there is little evidence that the existing capital structures help mitigate the impact of oil 
shocks.
1 To be sure, in some cases the countries’ international portfolios are such that 
reactions of the current account balances are partially offset by profits or losses on 
international positions. But there is much scope for improvement.  
  Possible Future Modifications to External Capital Structures. The international 
portfolios of both countries can be altered in ways that would ameliorate the impact of 
oil shocks. For Jamaica, the currency composition of official reserves could be shifted 
toward currencies that tend to do well when the oil price increases. Identifying which 
currencies will be positively correlated with the oil price in the future is difficult; in the 
recent past, the euro, Canadian dollar, and Norwegian krone performed well when oil 
prices increased. For Trinidad and Tobago, increased exposure to foreign assets that are 
negatively correlated with the oil price could mitigate the impact of oil price shocks on 
its external accounts. One way this could be attained is by investing some of the assets in 
its oil stabilization fund in transportation equities of advanced economies. 
                                                 
1 This is contrary to the Kilian et al. (2009) finding for broad aggregates of oil exporting and importing countries. 3 
 
 
We note at the outset a caveat. Part of our analysis depends on having accurate time series of 
capital gains and losses on international positions. But time series of the capital gains component of 
a country’s international investment position generally do not exist; see Curcuru et al. (2008) and 
Curcuru et al. (2009) on difficulties inherent in creating such time series for the United States. In 
this study we estimate capital gains series as the difference between changes in the net foreign asset 
position and the current account balance, as is common in the literature. However, without actual 
data on international capital gains we have no way of knowing that the resulting time series are 
accurate. Finer analysis awaits better quality data on the gains and losses on international 
investment positions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some basic economic 
indicators for each economy. Section 3 describes and analyzes the current capital structure of 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago using the most recent data available, with an eye toward 
identifying potential currency mismatches. In section 4 we empirically investigate the impact of oil 
shocks on external accounts. The time series results are interpreted with a particular focus on any 
evidence of international risk-sharing. In section 5 we discuss ways in which each country’s capital 
structure could be altered. We present our conclusions in section 6. 
 
2. Basic indicators of the importance of oil in each economy 
We chose for this study two Caribbean countries that have a high degree of trade openness 
and whose economies are dependent, in different ways, on the world oil market. Basic indicators 
show that Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (henceforth TT) are potentially vulnerable to oil 
market swings. 4 
 
For Jamaica, much of its persistent current account deficit, which has averaged roughly 10 
percent of GDP over the past decade, owes to oil imports. When oil prices were very low (for 
example, in 1998), oil contributed only about 25 percent to the overall trade deficit. However, in 
years with more elevated oil prices the contribution of oil to Jamaica’s trade deficit often exceeded 
50 percent (top panel of figure 1). Moreover, Jamaica receives, in effect, a double penalty; not only 
does its trade deficit worsen when oil prices surge, but its currency also tends to depreciate against 
the U.S. dollar (bottom panel of figure 1), potentially exacerbating the impact of adverse oil shocks 
on its economy through adverse balance sheet effects that could outweigh any traditional 
expenditure switching effect of the depreciation. Finally, at least recently, when the Jamaican dollar 
depreciated, its spreads also widened (figure 2).  
The economy of TT, an oil exporter, is also intimately linked to the oil market. As the oil 
portion of the trade balance increases, so does overall GDP (figure 3); the correlation between the 
two series is a strikingly high 0.92. Moreover, dollar-based oil prices have translated almost directly 
into TT$ revenues; while the TT$ is a floating currency, it has fluctuated little vis-à-vis the U.S. 
dollar over the past decade (figure 4).
2 Spreads in TT are largely in line with, if not a little lower 
than, overall EMBI spreads, and as such increased sharply in the last quarter of 2008 (figure 5). 
 
3. Existing capital structures and currency mismatches 
In this section we present information on each country’s external capital structure and 
evaluate potential currency mismatches. 
The destabilizing potential of currency mismatches is well understood, so we will not 
discuss it in detail here. Briefly, a mismatch in the currency denomination of credit flows and debt 
                                                 
2 Note that while in nominal effective terms the TT$ has been depreciating since 2002, in real CPI-based terms (not 
shown) the TT$ has been appreciating since 2004.  5 
 
stocks creates a vulnerability that has been linked to the increased likelihood and severity of 
financial crises. For example, if a country borrows heavily in foreign-currency-denominated debt, a 
currency depreciation would immediately and severely worsen government and private balance 
sheets and greatly increase debt repayment burdens. Firms would in turn reduce investment, 
generating pressure for further currency depreciation.
3  
3.1 The Currency Mismatch Measure 
We use as a summary measure the Goldstein and Turner (2004) Aggregate Effective 
Currency Mismatch (AECM), which compares measures of foreign currency debt to the ability to 
service the debt via export revenue. The currency mismatch measure requires information on a 
country’s foreign assets and liabilities as well as the currency composition of its debt components. 
For foreign assets and liabilities, we focus on bonds, deposits, and loans—the items that matter 
most for the assessment of potential currency mismatches—although we also present information 
on other assets and liabilities (notably, portfolio equity and FDI). For debt, we are most interested in 
ascertaining the extent to which it is denominated in foreign currencies. The greater share of debt 
that is foreign currency denominated, the greater are the potential currency mismatch and 
vulnerability to negative shocks.  
AECM is calculated as follows: 
 
(1)  ) % ( * ) / ( TD FC XGS NFCA AECM  , if NFCA<0, 
) % ( * ) / ( TD FC MGS NFCA AECM  , if NFCA>0, 
 
                                                 
3 The link between the contractionary effect of currency crises and the initial currency mismatch has been emphasized 
in both theoretical and empirical literature. See for instance, Goldstein and Turner (2004), Krugman (1999), Jeanne and 
Zettelmeyer (2002), Schneider and Tornell (2004), and Aghion et al. (2004). 6 
 
where NFCA is net foreign currency assets (specifically, those related to bonds, deposits, and 
loans), XGS is exports of goods and services, MGS is imports of goods and services, and FC%TD is 
foreign currency debt as a percentage of total debt (expressed as a percent).
4  
AECM is formulated as a shorthand measure of a country’s vulnerability to a large currency 
depreciation. Typically the focus is on net foreign currency debtors (NFCA<0), who in a currency 
crisis would face the possibility of rising debt burdens. An increasingly negative NFCA combined 
with greater reliance on foreign currency debt signals a more vulnerable currency mismatch. Note 
that a positive NFCA is scaled by imports, but when negative NFCA is scaled by exports (because a 
depreciation generates a positive boost to exports, which should somewhat offset the adverse 
balance sheet effect). Finally, as specified in (1), if NFCA is positive then so is AECM, indicating a 
situation in which a depreciation of the domestic currency would generate positive balance sheet 
effects.  
As defined in equation (1) the AECM has no upper or lower bounds. That said, in Goldstein 
and Turner (2004), in a sample of 22 emerging markets over the 1994-2002 period, the AECM 
measure generally falls in the -40 to +80 range, except for Argentina’s extreme AECM values. In 
2002 the AECM was -310 for Argentina, negative but less extreme for countries like Brazil (-33) 
and Turkey (-41), moderately positive (between 0 and +10) for many Asian emerging market 
countries (but not for the Philippines), and sizeable and positive for the commodity exporters 
Venezuela and Peru.
5 AECM will be a larger negative value (depicting a worse currency mismatch) 
                                                 
4 We follow Goldstein and Turner (2004) and calculate NFCA as the sum of cross-border BIS deposits and international 
reserves net of liabilities to BIS banks, international bonds and multilateral loans outstanding. Note that FDI and 
portfolio equity are excluded from NFCA, which is not dissimilar from their treatment in Lane and Shambaugh (2009) 
measures of the currency composition of international positions. 
5 As an example of an AECM calculation, consider 2002 information for Brazil. It had an NFCA of -$75 billion, 
supported by annual exports of roughly $69 billion. Thus, NFCA/XGS was -1.1. Compounding that was foreign-
currency debt ratio (FC%TD) of about 31 percent. Multiplying NFCA\XGS by 31 yields the AECM of -33. 7 
 
when NFCA is a larger negative value, exports are smaller, and the percentage of foreign currency-
denominated debt is larger. 
3.2 Jamaica’s External Capital Structure 
Table 1 summarizes 2005-2008 data on Jamaica’s capital structure. Panel (A) provides 
details on foreign assets and liabilities. We focus on bonds, deposits, and loans, but for 
completeness we also include data on equities and FDI. Over this four-year period Jamaica’s 
increasingly negative net foreign asset (NFA) position surpassed negative 100 percent of GDP. 
Jamaica’s foreign assets have been stable (albeit with modest growth in FDI assets and portfolio 
equity assets); the large and growing negative NFA position owes to rapidly growing foreign 
liabilities (a doubling of cross-border bond and bank debt, with noteworthy increases in 
international bond issuance and international liabilities to BIS reporting banks), with both private 
and public sectors having increased their foreign borrowing.
6 FDI liabilities, which account for 
roughly half of Jamaica’s foreign liabilities, have also risen, albeit not at the rate of bond and bank 
debt growth. 
In panel (B) we provide information on the level and composition of total debt liabilities 
based on data reported by the Bank of Jamaica. Domestic public sector debt outstanding has been 
relatively stable in recent years and is denominated mostly in domestic currency, with the portion 
that is US$-denominated falling from 17 percent in 2005 to 12 percent in 2008. The proportion of 
floating-rate debt has increased significantly, reaching 62 percent of the domestic public debt as of 
December 2007. Adding in public sector liabilities from panel (A), including multilateral loans, 
total public sector debt liabilities, at 121 percent of GDP, is very high by international standards.  
                                                 
6 Based on the underlying bond issuance data, 80 percent of the outstanding international bonds are denominated in U.S. 
dollars, with the remaining 20 percent denominated in euros. 8 
 
With a large amount of public sector floating-rate debt, the government budget is exposed to 
significant interest-rate risk. For example, in the recent global financial crisis, Jamaican spreads 
rose dramatically, widening even relative to the EMBI Global benchmark (figure 2). Increased risk 
aversion by global investors has translated into higher borrowing costs for all emerging markets, 
and especially those with high debt levels (such as Jamaica). The combination of a large debt 
burden and floating rate securities could thus prove problematic. 
Although Jamaica’s domestic public sector debt is denominated primarily in Jamaican 
dollars, the rise in external debt (liabilities from panel (A)) has resulted in an increasing reliance on 
foreign currency borrowing. Combined with strong domestic credit growth (a third of which is in 
foreign currency), this has resulted in an increase in the share of total liabilities denominated in 
foreign currency from 49 percent at the end of 2005 to an estimated 57 percent in September 2008.  
Jamaica’s AECM is negative and deteriorating (panel (C)), signaling an increasingly 
dangerous currency mismatch. Its AECM for 2007 is sizeable not because exports are small (they 
are large at roughly 50 percent of GDP), but because the NFCA is large and negative (at almost -
40% of GDP) and 54 percent of its debt is foreign-currency denominated. Jamaica, with a large and 
growing negative foreign exchange exposure on top of a large and growing debtor position, is 
vulnerable to significant depreciations of the Jamaican dollar versus the U.S. dollar. 
3.3 Trinidad and Tobago’s External Capital Structure 
Table 2 summarizes data on TT’s capital structure over the 2005-2008 period.
7 TT’s overall 
NFA position is negative, but over the past four years has improved, largely due to the high oil 
prices (panel (A)). Growth in foreign assets has been driven by international reserves (including 
accumulations in the oil stabilization fund) and cross-border bank deposits. A large proportion of 
                                                 
7 Data on TT’s debt structure are not always readily accessible. Unless otherwise noted, data are from the BIS-IMF-
OECD-World Bank External Debt Hub. 9 
 
external liabilities is FDI. Excluding FDI, which we do when computing AECM, TT is considered a 
net creditor in foreign currency. 
TT’s total debt-to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP ratios have improved in recent years (panel 
(B)). The public debt-to-GDP ratio is currently low by international standards at 17 percent. Much 
of TT’s debt is denominated in foreign currency, mostly the U.S. dollar. However, TT does not 
suffer from a currency mismatch if one considers that TT’s main asset is oil, which trades 
internationally in U.S. dollars. The TT$, a floating currency, fluctuates little against the U.S. dollar 
and is largely unchanged over the past decade (figure 4).  
TT’s NFCA is positive ($8.6 billion in 2007) and, hence, so is its AECM. With a positive 
NFCA, from a currency mismatch perspective foreign-currency-denominated debt is not 
problematic, as a currency depreciation would lead to capital gains on external positions. In other 
words, TT’s positive AECM indicates a long position in foreign currencies (the U.S. dollar in 
particular), which could be stabilizing even in the face of shocks large enough to require a one-off 
exchange rate adjustment. TT’s long position in foreign exchange is rare for an emerging economy, 
as net long positions are more common in the advanced economies (Lane and Shambaugh 2009). 
  
4.  Oil shocks and external accounts 
We measure the effects of oil shocks on each country’s external accounts and analyze the 
macroeconomic impact using the methodology of Kilian et al. (2009). The methodology involves 
two steps: (i) trace fluctuations in the real price of crude oil to the underlying demand and supply 
shocks in the crude oil market, and (ii) assess the response of each country’s external accounts to 
these shocks.  
 10 
 
4.1 Identifying Oil Demand and Supply Shocks 
As in Kilian et al. (2009), following the identification strategy of Kilian (2009) we estimate 
a structural VAR model based on monthly data for the vector time series  t z , which consists of the 
percent change in global crude oil production, a suitably detrended measure of global real economic 
activity in industrial commodity markets, and the real price of crude oil.
8 The monthly model allows 
for two years worth of lags. The structural VAR representation of the model is 
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where  t   denotes the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations. The 
structural innovations are derived by imposing exclusion restrictions on 
1
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Fluctuations in the real price of oil are attributed to three structural shocks:  1t  , which denotes 
shocks to the global supply of crude oil;  2t  , which captures shocks to the global demand for all 
industrial commodities (including crude oil) that are driven by global real economic activity;
 and 
3t  , which denotes an oil-market specific demand shock.
9 We call these shocks oil supply shock, 
aggregate demand shock and oil-specific demand shock, respectively. 
                                                 
8 Analogous approaches have been employed to study the effect of oil demand and oil supply shocks on U.S. stock 
markets (Kilian and Park 2008) and to study the relationship between the U.S. retail gasoline market and the global 
crude oil market (Kilian 2008). 
9 The term global real economic activity used by Kilian et al. (2009) refers to real economic activity that affects 
industrial commodity markets rather than the usual broader concept of real economic activity underlying world real 
GDP or industrial output.  This distinction is necessary because an increase in value added in the service sector, for 
example, is likely to have a different effect on global demand for industrial commodities than an increase in 
manufacturing.  Unlike alternative measures of monthly global real activity such as indices of OECD industrial 
production, this index captures the recent surge in demand for industrial commodities from emerging economies such as 
China and India. See Kilian (2009) for a full discussion of the rationale and construction of this index. The oil-market 
specific demand shock is designed to capture shifts in precautionary demand for crude oil that reflect increased concerns 11 
 
As in Kilian (2009), the assumptions are that (i) oil producers are free to respond to lagged 
values of oil prices, real activity, and oil production in setting oil supply, but will not respond to oil 
demand shocks within the same month, given the costs of adjusting oil production and the 
uncertainty about the state of the crude oil market; (ii) increases in the real price of oil driven by 
demand shocks that are specific to the oil market will not reduce global real economic activity in 
industrial commodity markets within the month; and (iii) innovations to the real price of oil that 
cannot be explained by oil supply shocks or aggregate demand shocks must be demand shocks that 
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This structural model postulates that the real price of oil (conditional on lagged values of all 
variables) is determined by the intersection of the supply and demand curves for crude oil. Oil 
demand shocks (which do not shift the oil supply curve) move the demand curve along the supply 
curve, causing the real price of oil to change. The model also allows for oil supply shocks (e.g., an 
unexpected oil supply disruption caused by a war or driven by an exogenous political decision) to 
move the vertical supply curve along the downward-sloping demand curve, again causing the real 
price of oil to change. All three types of shocks are allowed to affect the real price of oil within a 
given month. The model further imposes that the shifts in the real price of oil triggered by oil-
market-specific demand shocks will not affect global aggregate demand within the same month. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
about future oil supply shortfalls and that are by construction orthogonal to the other shocks. For other possible 
interpretations, see Kilian (2009). 12 
 
This assumption is consistent with the sluggish response of real aggregates to shocks in oil markets 
documented in related literature. 
The response of the real price of oil to the three structural shocks (εjt, j=1,2,3) (from Kilian 
2009) is reported in figure 6, which is from Kilian et al. (2009). Although all three responses are 
ultimately transitory, the timing, persistence, and magnitude of the responses vary depending on the 
source of the shock. An unanticipated increase in oil-market specific demand (such as an increase in 
precautionary demand for oil) causes an immediate and persistent increase in the real price of oil 
that is characterized by overshooting; an unanticipated increase in aggregate demand for all 
industrial commodities causes a delayed, but sustained increase in the real price of oil; and an 
unanticipated oil supply disruption causes a short-lived increase in the real price of oil within the 
first year. 
  In this study we are interested in assessing the effect of these oil demand and oil supply 
shocks on external accounts. Because international data on external accounts for most countries are 
available only at annual frequency, whereas the shocks implied by Kilian’s (2009) VAR model are 
measured at monthly frequency, we follow Kilian et al. (2009) and construct annual measures of the 
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  , 
where  ,, ˆjti  refers to the estimated residual for the jth structural shock in the ith month of the tth year 
of the sample. Although data for  t z  are available as far back as 1973, we lose two years worth of 
observations in estimating the VAR model. Thus, the resulting annual shock series goes back to 
1975.  
Figure 7, also from Kilian et al. (2009), plots ˆ
jt  ,  1,...,3, j  and illustrates that oil price 
shocks are best thought of as composites of underlying demand and supply shocks. For example, the 13 
 
oil price shock of 1979/80 is the result of the superimposition of three large positive aggregate 
demand shocks in 1978, 1979, and 1980, a one-time spike in oil-specific demand in 1979 (at the 
time of the Iranian Revolution, the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) 
and an oil supply shock in 1980 (but interestingly not in 1979). 
4.2 Estimation of Dynamic Effects 
We then estimate the impact of the oil shocks on external balances, as in Kilian et al. (2009). 
Let  t y  denote a stationary macroeconomic aggregate of interest such as the share of the trade 
balance in GDP. We want to estimate the response of  t y  to demand and supply shocks in the crude 
oil market. We treat the shocks ˆ
jt  ,  1,...,3, j   as predetermined with respect to t y , which rules out 
contemporaneous feedback from t y  to the shocks.
10 This assumption allows us to examine the 
dynamic effects of the shocks on the dependent variable based on regressions of the form: 
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where  jt u  is a potentially serially correlated error and  ˆ
jt   is a serially uncorrelated shock. The 
parameter h is chosen to coincide with the maximum horizon of the impulse response function to 
be computed. In practice, we set the maximum horizon of the impulse responses to five years.
11 By 
definition the impulse response is  1, ˆ
tj t dy d  . Differentiation yields that  , ˆ
tj t i i j dy d    . Under 
                                                 
10 In contrast, strict exogeneity imposes in addition Granger non-causality from  t y  to ˆ
jt  . Pre-determinedness and strict 
exogeneity in our regression framework correspond to the notion of weak and strong exogeneity. For further discussion 
see Cooley and LeRoy (1985) and Engle et al. (1983). 
11 Given that oil demand may adjust sluggishly to higher oil prices, it would be desirable to know how much external 
balances adjust at longer horizons, but the short time span of data currently available precludes the required econometric 
analysis.  14 
 
stationarity, it follows that  ,, ˆˆ . tj t it ij t i j dy d dy d      So, to the extent that the oil market is 
predetermined with respect to macroeconomic aggregates and external accounts, which is a 
reasonable assumption in our application, a simple OLS regression can be used to consistently 
estimate the responses of external accounts. 
   Note however that this equation-by-equation approach is built on the premise that the shock 
series  ˆ
jt   are mutually uncorrelated. Whereas the structural VAR residuals  ˆjt   are orthogonal by 
construction, the annual shocks  ˆ
jt  , obtained by aggregating over time monthly estimates, need not 
be orthogonal. In our application, their correlation is very low, ranging from -0.11 to 0.07, making it 
reasonable to treat these shocks as orthogonal. 
  In the empirical analysis we consider the following six measures of each country’s external 
balance: 
 
  Non-Oil Merchandise Trade Balance (TBNO) 
  Oil Trade Balance (OILBAL) 
  Merchandise Trade Balance (TB) ≡ TBNO + OILBAL 
  Current Account (CA) ≡ TB + Service Trade Balance + Income Balance  
  Change in Net Foreign Assets (dNFA) 
  Capital Gains on Foreign Assets and Liabilities (CAPGAIN) ≡ dNFA + CA
 12 
 
The Net Foreign Assets (NFA) data are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), updated 
through 2007.
13 All other data (including the trade balance, current account, and GDP data) are 
from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. All external accounts are expressed in current 
                                                 
12 As CAPGAIN is calculated as the change in the net foreign asset position less the current account balance, it is 
subject to the caveats raised in Curcuru et al. (2008) and Curcuru et al. (2009). For Jamaica and TT, as well as for 
almost every country, there is a great need for directly measured—and, hence, presumably more accurate—data on 
international capital gains. 
13 Note that there is some discrepancy between Jamaica’s published IIP data (available from 2005 to 2007) and the Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti estimates (available for a much longer time period). 15 
 
U.S. dollars and, as is conventional, are normalized by nominal GDP for the empirical analysis. 
Estimation is for the period from 1980 through 2007.
14 
4.3 The Responses of External Balances 
 
Figure 8 shows the responses of external balances to oil shocks. We first discuss the 
responses of the oil trade balance, non-oil trade balance, and current account (panels (a) and (b)). 
Then we analyze whether the responses of capital gains are such that they help offset responses of 
the current account in a way that mitigates movements in the net foreign asset position (panels (c) 
and (d)).  
The responses of external balances to oil-specific demand and supply shocks are constructed 
from regression model (4). All responses have been normalized such that a given shock implies an 
increase in the real price of oil. The impulse response functions are framed by one-standard error 
bands based on estimated OLS standard errors.
15,16 
4.3.1 Trade and Current Account 
The estimated responses of oil trade balance, non-oil trade balance, and current account for 
the three types of oil shocks are shown in panel (a) for Jamaica and panel (b) for TT. Many of the 
explanations for the estimated responses are intuitive.  
For example, for Jamaica any shock that increases the real price of oil has a negative impact 
on the oil trade balance (first row of panel (a)). Global demand and oil-specific demand shocks have 
a sustained and significant impact, while the impact of oil supply shocks is short-lived, not 
                                                 
14 A more detailed description of these aggregates is provided in the data appendix of Kilian et al. (2009). 
15 A correction of the standard errors for autocorrelation and possibly heteroskedasticity could be considered here given 
the fact that the econometric model omits any dynamics.  
16 In background research work not reported in the paper (but available from the authors), we have used similar 
methodology to explore the impact of natural disasters and non-fuel commodity price shocks on Jamaica’s external 
accounts. We found no significant effects. Natural disasters data are from EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International 
Disaster Database (http://www.em-dat.net). The alternative non-fuel commodity price series used, including food prices, 
are from the IMF’s IFS database. Finding that these other shocks have limited impact on Jamaica’s external accounts 
need not imply that they are unimportant for Jamaica’s welfare and growth, but more likely mean that the methodology 
used in the paper to assess their impact might not be suitable for those shocks.  16 
 
surprisingly because the oil price response to the supply shock (figure 6) was short-lived. The 
responses for the non-oil trade balance are less precise, and thus the responses for the overall 
current account balance are similar to, but not exactly same as, the responses from the oil trade 
balance. Overall, we can conclude that demand shocks that raise the real price of oil lead to a 
deterioration in Jamaica’s current account.  
For TT, the most precisely estimated responses (those that are significantly different zero) 
are for the global demand shock (second column of panel (b)). A global demand shock that raises 
the real price of oil leads to an improvement in not only the oil trade balance but also the non-oil 
trade balance and, hence, also the current account balance.
17 Responses to other shocks are 
imprecisely measured and therefore less conclusive.  
4.3.2 Current Account, Capital Gains, and the Net Foreign Asset Position 
To ascertain whether the external capital structures help mitigate the impact of oil price 
shocks, we focus on the current account, capital gains on international positions, and the NFA 
position. Theory suggests that in a financially integrated world oil-importing nations should take 
equity stakes in oil-exporting countries in order to hedge against oil price volatility (see for instance 
Ghironi et al. 2007). This hedging would allow oil-importing countries to earn capital gains, 
offsetting the impact of the shock on the oil trade balance and the current account, thereby shielding 
the NFA from oil prices fluctuations. In our analysis, we ask the following. Does the capital gains 
path tend to offset the response of the current account in a way that mutes the overall response of 
external national wealth (the NFA position)?  
                                                 
17 As Kilian et al. (2009) discuss, under incomplete markets, a surplus in the oil trade balance should lead to a deficit in 
the non-oil trade balance. However, in the case of the global demand shock, the same shock that drives the oil price up 
can also drive the non-oil trade balance up if the global demand increase affects other export sectors of the economy. 
What we thus estimate and observe is the net effect. It is not surprising, therefore, to see that the response of the non-oil 
trade balance compounds the effect on the oil trade balance. 17 
 
Panels (c) and (d) show the responses of the current account, capital gains, and the NFA 
position to oil price shocks. For Jamaica, in one case, global demand shocks, capital gains move in 
the opposite direction of the current account responses, at least to some extent (panel (c), second 
row). But overall, shocks that raise the real price of oil tend to negatively impact Jamaica’s NFA 
position, suggesting that for the most part Jamaica’s external capital structure is not mitigating the 
impact of these shocks. For TT, there is some evidence, not overwhelming, that for demand shocks 
(the middle and bottom rows) the external capital structure mitigates some of the impact on the 
NFA position (panel (d)).  
 
5. Potential Modifications of the External Capital Structures 
In this section we discuss potential portfolio modifications that may help to better hedge 
against the risks posed by oil price shocks (based on the analysis from Section 4) and external 
shocks more generally (based on the information from table 1 and 2). We stress that what follows is 
a cursory analysis that should be seen as illustrative.  
5.1 Jamaica 
To shield the net foreign asset position in the face of an oil price shock, capital gains should 
offset current account movements. Because Jamaica’s current account balance is strongly affected 
by oil price changes (top panel of figure 9), to do so the country portfolio (or capital structure) 
should be strongly and positively correlated with oil prices.  
Oil prices have a strong positive correlation with a wide range of assets. One example is oil 
company stocks or oil-related exchange-traded funds (ETFs); another, perhaps more feasible, is a 
fund based on a broad equity index of a country that has both substantial oil production and deep 
equity markets (e.g., Norway or Canada). Given the close link between the oil price and currency 18 
 
movements of oil-exporting countries (Chen and Rogoff, 2003), one concrete way to implement 
such a portfolio would be to switch part of the official reserve portfolio into these fully convertible 
currencies.  
Jamaica’s current capital structure shows its vulnerability to currency fluctuations (table 1). 
In theory, a country with a procyclical exchange rate could hedge domestic output fluctuations by 
taking long positions in foreign currencies. This hedging, consistent with Lane and Shambaugh 
(2010), would provide an appreciating foreign asset during domestic economic contractions. 
Unfortunately, Jamaica—like many other emerging economies—displays no such evidence of 
access to international risk sharing via this channel. As figure 1 showed, the Jamaican dollar tends 
to depreciate during troubled macroeconomic times but, at the same time, the data in table 1 
indicate that Jamaica has a short position in foreign currency, not the preferred long position.  
Given Jamaica’s vulnerability to both oil price and exchange rate shocks, it might be able to 
take advantage of the recent tight positive relationship between the US$/euro exchange rate and oil 
prices (bottom panel of figure 9).  Whether this tight relationship will hold in the future is debatable. 
If it were to persist, increasing the allocation of euro-denominated assets in its foreign portfolio 
would help reduce fluctuations in its net foreign asset position and might ameliorate its currency 
mismatch. More direct ways to address Jamaica’s currency mismatch include reducing foreign 
currency borrowing, increasing trade (greater exports would reduce the magnitude of a negative 
AECM), and increasing local bond market development (a higher local currency share in total debt 
reduces the magnitude of the AECM).  
5.2 Trinidad and Tobago 
While TT’s current capital structure shows no substantial vulnerability to currency 
fluctuations (table 2), the response of capital gains on foreign assets and liabilities (CAPGAIN) to 19 
 
the various oil market shocks suggests that TT’s external capital structure can be altered to better 
shield the net foreign asset position against oil supply and oil-specific demand shocks. For TT, a 
portfolio that would hedge against the macroeconomic effects of oil shocks would have a strong 
negative correlation with oil prices, as the current account balance is tightly related to oil prices (top 
panel of figure 10).  
For assets that are negatively related to oil prices, one might consider the U.S. dollar. The 
U.S. dollar (bottom panel of figure 10) shows, at least in recent years, a tight (negative) relationship 
with oil prices, but this correlation might not hold in the future. If it does, to limit fluctuations in the 
net foreign asset position TT might increase its long U.S. dollar position. But holding dollar-
denominated assets would not suffice, as the TT$ fluctuates little with the U.S. dollar. Alternatively, 
assets that might have the same desirable characteristic of being negatively correlated with oil 
prices include a broad index of transportation stocks and, more directly, exchange traded funds that 
are constructed to co-move negatively with oil prices.
18 
 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper we have described the external capital structures of Jamaica and TT and 
analyzed how these structures did in the past—and could in the future—mitigate or exacerbate the 
impact of external shocks. We examined the capital structures and evaluated potential currency 
mismatches, and analyzed the response of external accounts to different types of oil shocks.
19  
The analysis of Jamaica’s external capital structure highlighted many vulnerabilities due to 
large and growing negative foreign exchange exposure combined with a large and growing debtor 
                                                 
18 It is likely that the Heritage and Stabilization Fund tries to manage its portfolio with consideration such as this in 
mind, although we have no definite way of knowing that. 
19 For Jamaica, we also investigated natural disasters and commodity price shocks, but found that these did not have a 
systematic and significant impact on its external accounts. 20 
 
position, much of which is financed by floating rate securities. Our investigation of the impact of oil 
shocks on external accounts revealed a pattern of capital gains responses to oil shocks that does not 
mitigate the macroeconomic effects of such shocks. A key consideration going forward is how the 
composition of Jamaica’s (net) international portfolio might be altered so as to create capital gains 
when there are shocks that increase the real price of oil. One potential way to ameliorate both 
general vulnerability to currency movements and its response to oil shocks is to change the 
composition of official reserves toward the euro and oil currencies such as the Norwegian krone and 
the Canadian dollar.  
TT, in contrast, has no evident problem with currency mismatches, as its international assets 
are larger than its liabilities (excluding FDI). That said, a key consideration going forward is how 
the composition of TT’s (net) international portfolio might be altered in order to generate capital 
gains when there are negative oil price shocks. Given that the TT$ fluctuates little with the U.S. 
dollar, one way to mitigate the response to oil shocks is to add assets—such as a leveraged U.S. 
dollar exchange-traded fund (ETF) or broad indexes of transportation shocks—that might co-move 
negatively with the price of oil. 
The efforts that many oil-exporting countries have put into building oil stabilization funds 
(such as TT’s Heritage Stabilization fund) recognize many of the issues we address. The debate on 
the establishment of sovereign wealth funds highlights a desire of oil-exporting countries to increase 
rate of returns from investments in good times. In contrast, we approach these issues by exploring 
ways to insulate the economy from positive and negative contingencies, both over time and across 
states of nature. 21 
 
Finally, we must restate an important caveat. In our analysis of the response of capital gains 
to oil price shocks we use capital gains series estimated by combining information from IIP and 
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Table 1: Summary Data for Jamaica’s Capital Structure  
(in millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise noted) 
   
  end-05 end-06 end-07 Sept-08 
(A) Foreign Assets and Liabilities      
Foreign Assets  6561 7298 7511  
  Cross-Border BIS Deposits  2228 2434 2728 2692 
  International Reserves less Gold  2170 2318 1878 2257 
  Foreign Direct Investment  1861 1989 2173  
  Portfolio Equity  301 557 731  
      
Foreign Liabilities  12942 15697 18347  
  International Bonds  2999 3774 4260 4587 
     Public Sector  2499 2824 3005 3512 
  Liabilities to BIS Banks  1294 2448 3345 4885 
     Public Sector  531 703 1065 1623 
  Multilateral Loans  1081 1025 940 900 
  Foreign Direct Investment  7389 8190 9513  
  Portfolio Equity  179 259 289  
   
Net Foreign Assets  -6381 -8399 -10837  
   NFA/GDP (%)  -68 -81 -101  
(B) The Structure of Debt   
Domestic Public Sector Debt  7434 7992 7907 8006 
   Floating rate (%)  49 56 62 62 
   US$-indexed or US$-denominated (%)  17 13 12 12 
   
Total Public Sector Debt  11545 12544 12918 14041 
   Public Debt/GDP (%)  123 121 121  
   
Private Domestic Bank Credit  2299 2744 3248 3698 
   Foreign Currency (%)  34 34 34 34 
   
Total Debt
  15107 17983 19700 22076 
   Foreign Currency (%)  49 51 54 57 
   Total Debt/GDP (%)  161 173 184  
(C) The Currency Mismatch Measure   
NFCA -976 -2495 -3939  
Exports 3994 4782 4928  
Aggregate Effective Currency Mismatch   -12 -27 -43  
 
Notes.  Data are primarily from the BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank External Debt Hub, supplemented by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and local sources.  Domestic public sector debt characteristics are provided by the 2007 Bank of 
Jamaica Financial Stability Report; we assumed no changes for 2008.  The foreign exchange share of private domestic 
bank credit is based on February 2008 data from the BOJ.  Net Foreign Currency Assets (NFCA) and Aggregate 
Effective Currency Mismatch (AECM) are calculated as defined by Goldstein and Turner (2004) and therefore exclude 
equity and FDI. Total Debt is estimated as the sum of International Bonds, Cross-Border Liabilities to BIS banks, 
Multilateral Loans, Domestic Public Sector Debt, and Private Domestic Bank Credit. 24 
 
Table 2.  Summary Data for Trinidad and Tobago’s Capital Structure 
(in millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise noted) 
     
  end-05 end-06 end-07    Sept-08 
(A) Foreign Assets and Liabilities      
Foreign  Assets  10871 14078 16210  
Cross-border BIS Deposits  4736  5918  7897  9118 
Int'l Reserves less Gold  4961  6586  6694  8775 
     Heritage and Stabilization Fund  871  1396  1759   
Foreign Direct Investment  1158  1556  1600   
Portfolio  Equity  15 18 20  
      
Foreign  Liabilities  19280 21226 22741  
International  Bonds  2050 2496 2291 2284 
      Public Sector  682  539  691  684 
Liabilities to BIS Banks  3129  2947  3204  3886 
      Public Sector  91  143  321  439 
Multilateral  Loans  482 434 438 411 
Foreign Direct Investment  13506  15246  16705   
Portfolio  Equity  113 102 103  
      
Net  Foreign  Assets  -8409 -7148 -6531  
    NFA/GDP(%)  -56 -39 -32  
(B) The Structure of Debt      
Domestic Public Sector Debt   1816  1878  2089  2364 
Total Public Sector Debt  3071  2994  3539  3898 
    Public Debt/GDP (%)  20  16  17   
      
Private Domestic Bank Credit  4272  4964  5935  6640 
        
Total Debt
  11749 12720 13957 15585 
    Foreign Currency (%)  48  46  43  42 
    Total Debt / GDP (%)  78  70  67   
(C) The Currency Mismatch Measure         
NFCA 4036  6627  8658   
Imports 5725  6843  7670   
Aggregate Effective Currency Mismatch  34  45  48   
 
Notes.  Data are primarily from the BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank External Debt Hub, supplemented by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and local sources such as CBTT (2008).  Net Foreign Currency Assets (NFCA) and Aggregate 
Effective Currency Mismatch (AECM) are calculated as defined by Goldstein and Turner (2004) and therefore exclude 
equity and FDI. Total Debt is estimated as the sum of International Bonds, Cross-Border Liabilities to BIS banks, 
Multilateral Loans, Domestic Public Sector Debt, and Private Domestic Bank Credit. 
 25 
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Figure 3. Trinidad and Tobago’s Dependence on Oil 
 
 











































Figure 4. A Longer-Term Perspective on Trinidad and Tobago’s Exchange Rate 
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Exchange Rate: Trinidad and Tobago (TT$/US$)
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Figure 6:  Responses to One-Standard Deviation Structural Shocks  























Notes: From Kilian et al. (2009), estimates based on model (3) described in the text. The confidence intervals were constructed using a recursive-
design wild bootstrap. 31 
 




















































Notes: From Kilian et al. (2009), annual averages of the structural shocks underlying the responses in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 8. Responses of External Balances to Oil Shocks 
 
The figures show estimated responses of external balances to three types of oil shocks: oil supply, global 
demand, and oil demand. Panels (a) and (b) show the responses of non-oil merchandise trade balance 
(TBNO), oil trade balance (OILBAL), and current account (CA), all scaled by nominal GDP, to these shocks. 
Panels (c) and (d) show the responses of capital gains on gross foreign assets and liabilities (CAPGAIN), 
current account (CA), and the change in the net foreign asset position (DNFA). All measures of external 
balances are scaled by nominal GDP. Each shock is defined so that it implies an increase in the real price of 
oil.   33
(a) Jamaica: OILBAL, TBNO, and CA 
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(b) Trinidad and Tobago: OILBAL, TBNO, and CA 
Response of OILBAL_GDP to OILSUPPLY
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(c) Jamaica: CA, CAPGAIN, and DNFA 
Response of CA_GDP to OILSUPPLY
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(d) Trinidad and Tobago: CA, CAPGAIN, and DNFA 
Response of CA_GDP to OILSUPPLY
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Figure 9. Jamaica: Current Account, Oil Prices, and the U.S. Dollar 
Jamaica: Current Account Balance
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Figure 10. Trinidad and Tobago: Current Account, Oil Prices, and the U.S. Dollar 
Trinidad and Tobago: Current Account Balance (mil US$)
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